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of supply, and national energy security. However, the expertise and
technology required to effectively explore petroleum resources and to
exploit them are often beyond the reach of the relevant host nation,
particularly where high initial capital expenditure or highly specialized
methods of extraction are required.
Foreign entities such as international oil companies (IOCs) may have
access to equipment, expertise, and financial resources the host nation may
currently lack and/or not be willing to “risk”. Importing these indispensable
development tools, however, often diminishes the net value the host nation
could otherwise have realized from the underlying assets. In response, the
host government may seek to adopt “local content” policies aimed at
capturing some of the business activities (and the value created through
them) that would otherwise need to be imported.
This paper explores the development and implementation of local
content policies in the petroleum industry; compares and contrasts policy
choices implemented by nations such as Brazil, Nigeria, Norway, and the
United Kingdom; and looks at the impact these policies have had and are
having on economic development in the countries that adopted them.
Finally, it examines modern-day areas of challenge and concern for
developing countries that seek to design and implement their own local
content policies.
I. Introduction1
Oil and natural gas2 are critical commodities, currently meeting more
than half of the world’s needs for primary energy consumption. 3 Petroleum
resources are expected to remain the dominant fuels for the global economy
1. “Everybody looks at oil and almost entirely forget that the percentage of jobs the oil
sector creates is relatively small compared to the population; the introduction of more
sophisticated exploration methods makes it even worse.” Emi Ayalla, quoted by S. Kamal
Hayder Kazmi, Leadership and Business Wisdom, PAKISTAN AND GULF ECONOMIST
(February 11, 2018) http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/2017/08/28/leadership-businesswisdom-35/. In addition, this paper is based on the authors’ own research and the key
findings from Eduardo G. Pereira, Tonje Gormley (eds), Local Content for International
Petroleum Industry (Pennwell, 2018).
2. These commodities are referred to collectively in this paper as “hydrocarbons” or
“petroleum.”
3. In 2015, oil and gas accounted for roughly 55% of the world’s primary energy
consumption. This amount has remained relatively consistent for more than a decade.
WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, World Energy Resources | 2016 at 4 (2016)
https://www.worldenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/World-Energy-Resources-Fullreport-2016.10.03.pdf.
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through at least 2040,4 and procuring these resources is serious business as
this sector accounts for roughly five percent of world GDP.5 Yet, despite
their currently indispensable status for the global economy, hydrocarbons
do not automatically confer wealth on the people of the host nations where
they are found. On the contrary: according to a 2013 study by the World
Bank, the petroleum sector typically gives rise to far fewer backward
economic links6 compared to other economic sectors.7 Although the
petroleum industry can generate much wealth, such wealth does not
typically spread through the host nation’s economy as readily as that
created by other industries.8
Extraction of oil and natural gas typically requires significant
investments of capital, technology, and expertise. Host nations starting to
develop their petroleum resources may lack some or all of the instruments
to undertake such investments themselves (including, for example, suitably
qualified local expertise and locally produced goods), forcing them to rely
on outside support from foreign or international companies for these. 9 This,
in turn, can create social and political unrest in the host nation as wealth
from the nascent petroleum industry may well end up in foreign hands more
readily than benefitting the development of a local economy. The same
concern might also exist in well-developed petroleum nations that may lack
the necessary skills, technology and/or infrastructure for job creation at a
national level as these nations tend to rely on foreign support to a different
extent and in a different manner. In part to counteract this risk, the host
nation may develop “local content policies” (LCPs) to try to capture more
4. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2017, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
AGENCY (2017) https://www.iea.org/weo2017/.
5. Depending on the figures used for world GDP, petroleum drilling accounts for 4.6%
to 6.5% of global GDP. Investopedia, What percentage of the global economy is comprised
of the oil & gas drilling sector?, INVESTOPEDIA (Sep. 10, 2018)
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/030915/what-percentage-global-economycomprised-oil-gas-drilling-sector.asp.
6. Backward economic linkage relates to a product that is being created in stages and
refers to the positive effect an increase in production further down the line of fabrication or
assembly has for the producer/manufacturer further up that chain (cf forward linkage, where
the initial production is intended to strengthen investment in later stages of the
manufacturing process).
7. Silvana Tordo, Michael Warner, Osmel E. Manzano, and Yahya Anouti, Local
Content Policies in the Oil and Gas Sector, 3-5, THE WORLD BANK (2013)
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/549241468326687019/pdf/789940REVISED000
Box377371B00PUBLIC0.pdf.
8. Id. at 7.
9. Id. at 9-10.
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wealth for itself.10 Such policies can be an important part of the petroleum
business; but what are they, and how do they work?
A. What is local content?
The Financial Times describes local content as “the materials, parts etc.
that have been made in that country rather than imported. A minimum level
of local content is sometimes a requirement under trade laws when giving
foreign companies the right to manufacture in a particular place.”11 While
there is no universally-accepted definition of this term in the petroleum
industry, “local content” or “national content” can be thought of as the
added value that petroleum activities bring to a host nation in addition to
the direct revenues obtained through sales of hydrocarbons belonging to the
government of that nation or from taxes, service fees, state participation, or
dues collected from companies carrying out upstream activities in that
nation.12 This is the working definition used throughout this paper.
B. What are LCPs?
LCPs are policies created to promote the use of local content in an
industry that might otherwise turn to foreign sources for goods and services.
LCPs seek to attract investors into the relevant host nation industry (aiming
for higher efficiency and possible lower costs in the future), while, at the
same time, putting these potential investors on notice as to the minimum
level at which they would be required to source products and services
locally and/or work with local companies, if they chose to invest. There will
always be goods and services that may be uneconomical or unfeasible to
locally produce or develop at least at a certain stage: examples range from
agricultural produce to support industry workers in countries where the
climatic conditions are unfavorable and may therefore require continued
importation of foodstuffs, to high-tech or capital-intensive tools that cannot
be produced solely through domestic construction, like floating production

10. See e.g., Damilola S. Olawuyi, Local content and procurement requirements in oil
and gas contracts: Regional trends in the Middle East and North Africa, at 6-7 THE OXFORD
INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY STUDIES (2017) https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/Local-content-and-procurement-requirements-in-oil-and-gascontracts-regional-trends-in-the-Middle-East-and-North-Africa-MEP-18.pdf.
11. FINANCIAL TIMES, Lexicon, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=local-content.
12. See e.g., John C. Anyanwu, Local Content in the Hydrocarbon Sector: Lessons of
Experience, Mozambique Coal and Gas Seminar in Maputo, Mozambique, (February 27-28,
2013).
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storage operating (FPSO) units, as Brazil discovered.13 As we will see
throughout this paper, there are many factors that may affect a given
country and a fine and intricate balance needs to be struck to decide its most
sensible and sustainable LCPs.
LCPs include policies to encourage training and employment of host
country nationals within the industry, as well as investment in developing
and procuring local goods and services, and “transfer” of technology
through assistance, investment, licensing, trade and/or training.14 Although
Corporate and Social Responsibility (CSR)15 is directly connected to LCPs,
they have different objectives and CSR will not be analyzed in this paper.
In addition, LCPs might also be designed to facilitate and promote
participation of state- and/or privately-owned “indigenous” companies
together with foreign entities in the petroleum activities of the relevant host
nation.
C. Why do countries adopt LCPs?
The reasons countries seek to encourage (and often require) the
development and use of local content are as varied as the countries
themselves. In general, however, it can be said that LCPs are perceived to
be a way of promoting investment in, and the economic growth of, the host
nation. They are meant to create jobs for local nationals in the petroleum
activities and to further the development of entire new industries, such as
banking, power generation, manufacturing or telecommunications, as well
as to build technological capabilities for the host nation. LCPs seek to
ensure the highest possible rate of domestic employment, strengthen the
local economy, and help the host country become less reliant on foreign
capital and expertise. In this sense, it is crucial to develop and support

13. See note 129 for further details.
14. International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association
(IPIECA), Local content strategy: A guidance document for the oil and gas industry,
(available for download at http://www.ipieca.org/resources/good-practice/local-contentstrategy-a-guidance-document-for-the-oil-and-gas-industry-1st-edition/).
15. Financial
Times,
Definition
of
corporate
social
responsibility,
http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=corporate-social-responsibility--(CSR)
(“[m]ovement
aimed at encouraging companies to be more aware of the impact of their business on the rest
of society, including their own stakeholders and the environment. [It] is a business approach
that contributes to sustainable development by delivering economic, social and
environmental benefits for all stakeholders. CSR is a concept with many definitions and
practices. The way it is understood and implemented differs greatly for each company and
country.”).
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Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)16 as they should be a relevant part
of local content development.
There have been very few examples of host nations that, on finding
petroleum resources in their territory for the first time, were able to draw on
an existing industrial/manufacturing base and immediately direct and
expand that base towards petroleum exploration and exploitation. This has
particularly been true of certain offshore operations where existing shipping
and maritime experience and infrastructure was available to support
offshore operations, as was the case, for example, in the North Sea.
However, most nations cannot count on the existence of such infrastructure
and/or related industry to develop their oil and gas resources which
increases the risks and complexities for all relevant stakeholders.
Due to oil and gas exploration tending to be a high-risk capital-intensive
activity, it is common for the host nation to draw on international
assistance, experience, and financing to develop their petroleum resources.
Given the dominance of established IOCs, high capital intensity and
sophistication of often cutting-edge petroleum technology, specialized
services and highly trained staff that are required to undertake these types
of activity, emerging petroleum provinces will, at least at the outset, nearly
always depend on foreign expertise. Some of these provinces may later find
it difficult to move away from such dependency.17

16. Organization of Economic Co-operation and Developent, Small and Medium-Sized
Enterprises (SMEs), https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3123 (“non-subsidiary,
independent firms which employ fewer than a given number of employees. This number
varies across countries. The most frequent upper limit designating an SME is 250
employees, as in the European Union. However, some countries set the limit at 200
employees, while the United States of America considers SMEs to include firms with fewer
than 500 employees. Small firms are generally those with fewer than 50 employees […].
Financial assets are also used to define SMEs.”).
17. U. Klueh, G. Pastor, A. Segura and W. Zarate, IMF Working Paper on Intersectoral Linkages and Local Content in Extractive Industries and Beyond – the Case of São
Tomé and Príncipe, at Appendix II INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2007)
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07213.pdf. The case of Norway is an
example of the law initially recognizing that foreign investors and their expertise were
required but being selective as to their suitability. HK Nordås, E. Vatne and P. Heum, SNF
Report No. 08/03 – The upstream petroleum industry and local industrial development. A
comparative study, at 63 INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION (2003) https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/164495/R08_
03.pdf?sequence=1.
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As noted above, revenue from petroleum operations18 may be quite
substantial but this does not automatically lead to the creation of significant
local employment or value-added opportunities.19 Nonetheless, sovereignty
over natural resources tends to vest in the nation where those resources are
located20 and governments may well experience pressure from their citizens
to translate that sovereignty into tangible benefits for the nation at large. Put
simply: people may reasonably believe they deserve a major share of the
economic gain derived from their national resources and expect their
government to get it for them.
Due to its importance, this sentiment often shapes a host government’s
approach to revenue management (i.e., the way in which the host nation
will use the revenues it collects from the oil and gas industry). Although
such revenue management may be essential for the welfare of the state and
its citizens, this paper does not address this aspect as it falls outside the
scope of LCPs. Nevertheless, readers should be aware that LCPs are a
frequently-chosen vehicle for achieving some revenue management goals,
as well as more traditional capacity building. In light of the broad scope of
potential uses for LCPs, it is not surprising that an estimated 90% of
resource-rich nations have turned to such policies at one point or another.21
Another rationale for implementing LCPs, particularly in developing
countries, is to provide protection for newly-established petroleum
industries and related enterprises to develop while being sheltered from the
rigors of international competition.22 Sometimes, the justification offered is
the purported need of the host nation for time to master advanced
technologies; at other times, it may be a desire to counteract subsidies
provided to established international industries that are supported or

18. For example, including bonuses or fees for rights to explore and develop the
resources, direct participation in the petroleum contracts, taxes on the petroleum activities
themselves, and profits from sale of the state’s share of production, if any.
19. Tordo, supra note 7, at 23-26.
20. This principle has evolved through a series of UN resolutions on resources and
related issues from the 1950s onward, including the Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty
Over Natural Resources (Resolution 1803 (XVIII) of 14 December 1962, UN Doc A75217
(1962), 2ILM (1963), p. 223), the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order (3 Resolution 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, UN Doc. A/5217 (1962), 2ILM
(1974), p.715), and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (Resolution 3281
(XXIX) of 12 December 1974, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974), 14 ILM (1975), p. 215).
21. Olawuyi, supra note 10, at 1.
22. Id. at 5; see also Tordo, supra note 7, at 24.
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sheltered by their own countries of origin.23 The success of local industries
can allow a host nation to become independent of expensive imports that
would otherwise be needed. Absent a preference for local content, much of
the potential value a host nation may otherwise gain from its nascent
petroleum industry could be lost, as such value would leak through
petroleum companies paying third parties or countries for equipment,
expatriates, and other goods and services brought in from abroad. Thus,
LCPs can, at least in theory, increase efficiency in the petroleum sector,
improve the host nation’s overall balance of payments, and mitigate the
burden on foreign currency that reliance on external sourcing often
entails.24
LCPs may also be seen as a way to broaden the host nation’s economic
base: requiring international companies to purchase goods and services
from local businesses gives those businesses revenues with which to
expand, modernize, and diversify. This, in turn, can enable the host nation
to weather the effects of a sudden fall in international commodity prices
that might otherwise lead to crippling losses, particularly where export
revenues for domestic resources decrease while their cost of production
remains the same.25 By encouraging expansion and diversification, LCPs
can hasten the nation’s overall economic development, thereby helping to
alleviate the effects of the so-called “Dutch disease” in which rapid growth
in the natural resource sector overwhelms other sectors of the domestic
economy.26

23. Sherry Stephenson,. Addressing Local Content Requirements in a Sustainable
Energy Trade Agreement, at 4 INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT (Jun. 2013) https://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2013/06/addressing-localcontent-requirements_opt.pdf.
24. In Nigeria, for example, industry experts estimated that before LCPs were put in
place, “up to 90 percent of capital input went overseas via equipment purchases, consulting
and service fees and expatriate wages.” Ugo Nwokeji, The Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation and the Development of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry: History, Strategies,
and Current Directions, at 44 BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY (2007)
http://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/page/9b067dc6/noc_nnpc_ugo.pdf.
25. See e.g., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, Presented at the Annual Meeting of
Arab Ministers of Finance in Manama, Bahrain (Apr. 2016), https://www.imf.org/external/
np/pp/eng/2016/042916.pdf.
26. Klueh, supra note 17, at 6; see also Sunny Oputa, Local Content: A Vehicle of Hope
or an El Dorado, ENERGY & CORPORATE AFRICA (2013) https://www.energycorporateafrica.
com/local-content---a-vehcle-of-hope--or-.
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D. What can be learned from the experience of nations with LCPs?
This paper will proceed with an examination of key considerations in
LCPs, including goals, definitions and methods used. It will look at the
outcomes experienced by nations generally regarded as pioneers in LCPs,
including the United Kingdom, Norway, Nigeria and Brazil, as well as the
experiences of developing oil and gas producers like Angola, Indonesia,
and Kazakhstan who have been eager to design and implement LCPs of
their own. Finally, this paper analyzes ongoing concerns and challenges for
LCPs in developing countries, identifying those elements that have proven
to be of value in their design and implementation and those that have not. In
short, this paper aims to provide the background information as well as key
lessons learned for any country which is currently considering whether to
adopt or modify LCPs within its own jurisdiction.
II. Key Considerations for LCPs
A. What are the host nation’s current resources and prospective needs?
Policymakers considering LCPs should start with a frank assessment of
the host nation’s wider resources and needs. A nation that already has a
highly developed industrial infrastructure, for example, will have different
capabilities and resources available than a nation transitioning from a
largely agrarian economy. The former might set ambitious targets for rapid
local participation in petroleum activities whereas the latter may be better
served with policies emphasizing more foundational steps, like construction
of roads and port facilities and training in industrial operations and
management. The examples of the United Kingdom (UK) and Angola are
illustrative in this respect. When development of the North Sea petroleum
fields began in earnest in the 1970s and 1980s, the UK already had major
ports, roads, and a large and relatively underutilized industrial work force
available to support the new sector and to capture a larger share of the
value-added activities than might have otherwise been possible. Angola, on
the other hand, began the build-up of its petroleum industry from a far
different position, having, at that point, only recently emerged from several
decades of civil war. Beset by widespread poverty, Angola inevitably had
differing needs for local participation.27
Similarly, the host country should consider the extent and potential of its
oil and gas resources. Does it appear that there are sufficient oil and gas
27. The examples of the UK and Angola are discussed in more detail in the sections that
follow.
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reserves (or good prospects for future finds) to support a significant longterm domestic supply and/or export business? If so, planners may want to
focus on building a domestic petroleum industry and other related sectors to
take full advantage of these long-term prospects and/or any export
opportunities. If not, it may be more prudent for that country to focus on
LCPs that bolster short-term benefits for its petroleum industry (i.e.
increase foreign investments) but also on LCPs that enhance other
industries with a potentially long-term effect.28 On the other hand, if the
host nation’s energy resources are small or its foreign supplies of petroleum
insecure, it may wish to focus on matching its petroleum production to its
domestic consumption in order to lessen the impact of fluctuations in world
prices for the petroleum it would otherwise have to import. LCPs for a
prospective petroleum exporter will likely be very different from those of a
host nation whose immediate objective is to meet its domestic petroleum
needs. For example, Norway historically aimed to reduce its internal oil and
gas consumption by increasing the development of renewable energy
sources for domestic use. This enabled Norway to export the maximum
amount of oil and gas and establish itself as a reliable supplier while using
domestic hydropower to satisfy its local energy demand. A different
strategy could have been used, had Norway been keen to export petroleum
products to harness the added value but this would have required further
investments in its refining and petrochemicals capacity first.
B. What does the host country seek to achieve?
The previously-cited World Bank study on LCPs stresses the importance
of clearly-defined and realistic objectives.29 Other commentators have noted
that a lack of clarity in a host nation’s assessment of its objectives
ultimately risks a misalignment between these objectives and the policies
intended to attain them.30 Setting objectives requires careful evaluation of
current conditions to reveal areas where the host nation needs improvement,
and an unsentimental assessment of whether it has the necessary physical,
economic, and human resources. For example, the level of experience and
capabilities of host nations seeking to exploit their first petroleum
discoveries will likely differ from those nations where petroleum
development or production is already underway. Host nations with no or
few domestic business entities devoted to supporting or participating in
28. See Tordo supra note 7, at 9.
29. Id. at xvii.
30. See e.g., Olawuyi, supra note 10, at 3, 11.
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petroleum activities will likely require different LCPs from those countries
where petroleum activities have already begun.31
A country with a relatively low level of industrial development may seek
to first improve its educational system, physical infrastructure, and political
and economic environment in order to foster local industry that can
participate in petroleum activities. As the host nation’s petroleum industry
and supporting businesses and institutions mature, it may seek more
involvement of the local workforce in management and executive positions
of foreign companies. This, in turn, can give local nationals the experience
needed to lead the local petroleum industry to a level at which it can
compete on an international stage. Some countries, like Norway, have used
LCPs to build up their national research and development (R&D)
capabilities so that they can compete effectively in the future.32
Above all, LCPs should be dynamic: over time, policies should evolve to
meet the changing circumstances of the host nation. This must, however, be
weighed against the need to provide stability and certainty to attract
potential investors. Host nations whose LCP regimes are plagued with
uncertainty or excessive requirements may find that investment is harder to
get as a result. Countries seeking to craft LCPs must be prepared not only to
clearly define what it is they want to achieve and be cognizant of how their
aspirations will evolve over time, but also consider the policy frameworks
(e.g. by means of legislation, regulation or contract) that will provide the
right blend of flexibility and stability.33
C. How will the host country measure local content and audit its
compliance?
Another important consideration is what exactly the host nation means
by “local content.” Not surprisingly, the answer may vary between nations,
or even within the same nation, depending on context. “Local hire”
requirements may be a key part of the policies; and for a nation suffering
from widespread unemployment, hiring any citizen of the host nation may
be enough to count towards fulfilling such requirements. If, however, the
host government seeks to encourage economic development in a particular
area, a more specific and limited definition may be used in which “local”
means a resident of the targeted region. The term “national content” may be
preferable where a reference to the nation as a whole is favored over
31. See Tordo, supra note 7, at 3.
32. The Norwegian experience is discussed in more detail below.
33. Olawuyi, supra note 10, at 10.
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specific subnational regions, however, this is not the commonly used
terminology.
Host nation expatriates living abroad pose special questions: would
hiring such persons satisfy the requirements? If they remain abroad, they
may not add as much value (in the form of taxes, spending, and social
contact) as a national living in the host nation. How would that analysis
differ, if the host nation expatriate returned home? On the one hand, hiring
a returning expatriate will not produce a net reduction in local
unemployment but encouraging the return of highly-skilled workers to the
host nation may still be worthwhile to the extent it helps improve the
overall labor pool (for example, by making such workers available to other
developing industries in that country). LCP local hire requirements can thus
be used to reverse so-called “brain drain” by providing a reason for such
workers to repatriate themselves.34 The definition of “local” can be used
creatively to encourage host nations to set goals that may not be
immediately obvious.
Similarly, when an IOC is required to contract with local companies or
be present “locally”, the host nation government must decide what
businesses will qualify. Is mere physical presence in the host nation enough
to make a business “local?” If so, how much “presence” in country is
necessary? Legal residence or place of incorporation, for example, are
reasonably easy to determine; but would they suffice? Perhaps the situs of
the “local” company headquarters or its principal business activities would
be a better measure. Ownership may be a key criterion: some countries, like
the Philippines, permit their governments to make agreements for natural
resource development only with host nation citizens, or companies whose
capital is controlled by such citizens.35 However, that raises again the
questions as to what amounts to a “citizen?” Is it enough to be a host nation
passport holder, or does it require tax residence in the host country, or both?
If being “local” is merely determined by location, this may lead to
another issue if the purportedly local business turns out to be no more than
34. Michael Oluwagbem, Local content, diaspora ability & global capabilities, THE
WORLD BANK (Nov. 17, 2010) https://blogs.worldbank.org/youthink/local-content-diasporaability-global-capabilities.
35. In the Philippines, for example, companies entering into co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreements must be at least 60% owned by Filipino citizens.
CONST. (1987), art. XII, § 2 (Phil.). In addition, Angola and Nigeria possess similar rules
referring to a controlling interest by their own nationals and/or companies. See: Eduardo G.
Pereira, Tonje Gormley (eds), Local Content for International Petroleum Industry
(Pennwell, 2018).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

644

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 4

a representative office of a foreign company that outsources all its activities
to affiliates or other businesses abroad, adding little or no value to the host
nation economy. This is why it is important to understand, for example,
where products are being manufactured, developed and assembled as these
steps should lead to a higher level of employment in and added value to the
host nation. It is also important to understand the different stages of an oil
and gas business and how it works in a practical manner in order to estimate
where the maximum number of local jobs and employment can be found.
For example, IOCs are less likely to undertake the majority of the
petroleum operations by themselves but rather outsource such activities to
third parties. Therefore, a higher focus on the IOCs instead of services
contractors may add less value from an employment perspective. The
proportion of local nationals employed in a business work force, or the role
they play in its management, might also be used to determine whether
inclusion of an ostensibly local business is sufficient to meet the host
nation’s requirements.36 These are, of course, just some of the
considerations that may be utilized by a host government in mapping out a
definition of “local.”
Similar issues arise when determining whether LCPs are being complied
with or are meeting their designed goals. As a general proposition, the
clearer the metrics employed, the easier it will be to monitor and enforce
most policies; but metrics are not always just neutral measures of
compliance or success. Metrics used to measure local content might include
the (1) number of local employees hired, trained, or promoted; (2) monetary
value of goods and services purchased locally by the international
company; (3) participation of local companies in the relevant activities; (4)
involvement of local institutions in R&D activities; or by other means such
as the development and/ enhancement of other sectors (e.g. the shipping
industry). A company’s employment strategies to meet a local hire quota,
however, may vary significantly depending on whether the quota is based
on total headcount or total payroll. As some commentators have noted,
“often, metrics ultimately drive company and regulator behavior.” 37
These metrics may need to be dynamic: in other words, they may need to
be adapted as petroleum activities within the host country move from
exploration through development to production. In some countries,
particularly those whose hydrocarbon potential is not yet fully known, these
activities will of course be gone through again as each new deposit is
36. Tordo, supra note 7, at 2-3.
37. Id. at 65.
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mapped out and developed.38 One of the critical challenges will be
verifying compliance: how will the foreign investor (and host nation
government) know if they are actually complying with the relevant
regulations and contractual obligations? Especially in host countries with
little experience in petroleum production, or whose educational
infrastructure is not geared toward industrial activities, it can be challenging
to employ the number of personnel necessary to verify compliance.
Many host governments tend to rely on the information provided by the
IOCs; Brazil, on the other hand, developed a certification system which
helps the industry and the Brazilian government assess compliance of the
relevant metrics agreed in the host granting instruments.39 There are certain
companies recognized by Brazil’s national petroleum agency who can
certify the precise amount of local content that is embedded in each good or
service acquired for the relevant projects. In that way, this process
facilitates the regulators’ monitoring task and provides more certainty for
the oil and gas companies as they know sooner rather than later whether
and to what extent they are compliant with the given regulations and their
contractual commitments.
In any case, LCPs should be targeted at each country’s needs and
expectations. For example, in Brazil local employment or training is less
likely to be an issue as the petroleum industry has been well developed for
many decades and IOCs can easily find local and well experienced people
to staff their company. It is cheaper and more efficient than hiring expats
and this is why it is less common to find expats working in Brazil along
with complex foreign work visa regulations. However, certain technologies
and/or equipment might be a key issue to develop the petroleum industry in
Brazil as they are not easily available locally. This is also the case in Iran
which manages to produce quite well its oil and gas reserves but faces a
number of difficulties in increasing the recovery from its fields without
external support of foreign technology like fracking and pumping. By
contrast, new petroleum provinces like Senegal or Guyana are less likely to
be able to rely on their national work force to staff any petroleum company
locally so these countries are more likely to add higher emphasis on training
and local work force in comparison to Brazil or Iran.

38. Id. at 2-3.
39. Information concerning the Brazilian program is available online at the website of
the National Agency for Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (available online at
http://www.anp.gov.br/wwwanp/exploracao-e-producao-de-oleo-e-gas/conteudolocal/certificacao-de-conteudo-local) (last accessed January 17, 2019).
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D. How will LCPs affect petroleum companies in the host nation?
LCPs can apply to any industry but pose special challenges for the
petroleum sector: IOCs accustomed to working within a complex web of
logistics and suppliers which they have built up over time may be required
by such policies to deal with unfamiliar and sometimes less experienced
local “partners.” The petroleum industry relies heavily on advanced
technology, well-trained personnel, and carefully planned and sequenced
activities. Involvement of new and untested parties in the supply chain
tends to add risk: adjusting to unfamiliar local business practices can
disrupt previously smooth-running processes, imposing delay and
corresponding costs. Depending on their prior experience, the overall
strength of the host nation’s educational system and other factors, local
participants in petroleum activities may initially be less efficient than their
international counterparts.40 Even in countries where LCPs and participants
are well-established, such policies can still entail inefficiency and higher
costs. The Brazilian General Accounting Office, for example, has
concluded that that nation’s LCPs add costs and delays to petroleum
activities within its jurisdiction which, in turn, discourage investment and
indirectly limit revenues that would otherwise have been available to the
Brazilian state.41
Despite these potential pitfalls, LCPs can offer benefits to the petroleum
industry. Although oil and gas activities are characterized by their reliance
on technologically advanced equipment and operations, there is always
need for unskilled labor. This is particularly true in areas such as
transportation and the distribution and provision of unsophisticated or lowtech supplies like food and water that are essential to petroleum operations
and can be locally sourced at a saving over import costs. 42 Developing a
local supply ecosystem can save shipping and import costs, thereby
producing immediate economic benefits, and promote competition that will
lead to additional savings over time. Capacity-building investments such as
the development of local suppliers and training programs (including but not
limited to mastering skills to comply with procurement requirements,
adding their profile into different databases from oil and gas companies,
etc.) for the domestic workforce, which are often LCP requirements, can
increase the local supply of suitable labor and reduce reliance on expatriate
40. Klueh, supra note 17, at 18.
41. TCU decision no. TC 030.511/2015-1 Group I, Class V, Plenary (3072–2016),
paragraph 256.
42. Tordo, supra note 7, at 12-13.
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employees who generally command higher wages. It is equally important to
provide funds and affordable financing options for SMEs, otherwise it will
be difficult for such “local” entities to comply with the required standards
and be able to compete.43 Moreover, business consultants suggest that
companies that overcome the “compliance mindset” and see LCPs as an
opportunity rather than a hindrance can set themselves apart from other
firms and reap the benefits of good host government relations:
More broadly, a successful local content program can improve relations
with local governments, leading to a smoother cost recovery process,
preferential access to additional licenses and projects, and a reduced risk of
industrial or social unrest. Finally, it can promote the development of a
sustainable relationship with the country, enabling the company to plan for
the long term.44
While this may seem an overly-optimistic outlook, a prudent investor
will always look to use the local legal environment to its advantage, just as
it would do with the relevant aspects of the physical and economic
environment. Doing so, however, requires a relatively stable regulatory
regime within the host country: similar to other laws, if LCPs are unclear,
conflicting, or subject to frequent change, the resulting uncertainty may
reduce investor interest or confidence and curtail the availability of funds
for future development in that host nation.
To the extent LCPs promote fulfilment of public expectations about
reasonably prompt and tangible benefits from the development of the host
nation’s resources, they may also help to stabilize the domestic
43. To address this situation, Nigeria, for example, created a local content development
fund which is sponsored by the oil and gas companies through their upstream contracts in
accordance with the country’s local content laws. Seun Adeye, 1% local content fund:
EFCC
to
go
after
defaulting
companies,
PULSE
(Nov.
2,
2018)
https://www.pulse.ng/news/local/1-local-content-fund-efcc-to-go-after-defaultingcompanies-sen-adeola/hvex3n1. Mexico followed a similar path creating a governmental
fund for the same purpose. Miriam Grunstein and Cybele Diaz-Wionzzek, Local content in
the petroleum industry – Mexico, BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY (Feb. 2017)
https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/c43bd724/MEX-pub-LocalContent020817.pdf. However, the mere existence of such funds may not be sufficient as SMEs may
face challenges accessing them and therefore further involvement and support by local
authorities is often required. Mike Odiegwu, Board´s intervention fund increases local
content in oil sector, THE NATION (Mar. 22, 2018) http://thenationonlineng.net/boardssintervention-fund-increases-local-content-oil-sector/.
44. Douwe Tideman, Arthur Ramos, Georges Chehade and Rose Landau, Local content
in oil and gas: Recasting the conversation, at 4 PWC STRATEGY& (2014).
https://www.strategyand.pwc.com/reports/local-content-oil-gas.
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environment in other ways. Resource development can disrupt existing
socioeconomic patterns in the host nation,45 and draining its natural
resources without an immediate corresponding return of value may seem
inequitable,46 provoking civil unrest. A massive influx of foreign capital
and workers can likewise cause societal frictions, and these may adversely
impact the relevant petroleum activities. When LCPs help to alleviate such
problems, “the benefits of maintaining social stability in a resource-bearing
locality and … to retain a social license to operate may be more important”
than the costs of compliance.47
E. How will the chosen policies affect other aspects of the host nation
economy?
LCPs may contravene trade agreements or other obligations whose value
to the host nation would have to be carefully evaluated.48 A policy that
boosts the petroleum industry and related enterprises but leads to
curtailment of trade in other sectors of the host nation’s economy may not,
on balance, be beneficial. Thus, the petroleum sector cannot be viewed in
isolation: LCPs must instead be aligned with the other economic
development policies of that country.49
Before adopting a set of LCPs, a host government would do well to
analyze the likely costs and benefits of all the relevant policies that may
already be available in its country.50 Unfortunately, there is no single
45. Tordo, supra note 7, at 26.
46. Olawuyi, supra note 10, at 6.
47. Id. at 8.
48. For example, local content rules may violate the Agreement on Trade-related
Investment Measures (TRIMs) introduced in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. However, it is outside the scope of this paper to analyze such
considerations. For further information, see e.g., Lisa Johnson, Space for Local Content
Policies and Strategies, at16 COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT (Jul. 2016).
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2016/10/giz2016-en-local-content-policies-study.pdf.
49. Tordo et al., supra note 7, at xiii.
50. An example of an industrial development policy other than local content is “importsubstitution-industrialization” where certain key sectors, such as manufacturing, are
protected from imports. The selective protection of these sectors allows them to develop,
adapt and become (more) competitive without being exposed to international market
pressure. As soon as the relevant sector has become sufficiently competitive, however, the
protectionist measure(s) ought to be removed as the artificially sheltered environment they
provide may otherwise work against further sector advancement. A. de Lima-Campos, Local
Content Requirements in the Oil and Gas Sector, (2013) https://www.scribd.com/
presentation/237251225/Local-Content-Requirements-in-the-Oil-and-Gas-Sector-A-deLima-Campos-Keynote-Day-1 (presentation).
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blueprint that can be followed to enhance industrial development: as with
fiscal regimes in the extracting industries, the choice of LCPs and the tools
to implement them very much depend on the specifics of each host nation.
This ties back to the previous points raised in this section: the fundamental
initial elements of an LCP are for the host nation (1) to know its own basic
strengths and weaknesses; (2) to understand the specific needs of the
petroleum activities about to be undertaken and the country’s ability to
meet those needs; and (3) to have formulated the country’s overall goals
and objectives for the policies in a clear and transparent manner. There can,
therefore, never be a “one size fits all” policy. Each policy drawn up in a
country and the experience gained in relation to it should be carefully
analyzed as these policies should have been designed to address the
particularities, context, and requirements of each nation. If the chosen
policies do not achieve their intended goals over time, they should be
modified or abandoned.
III. Key Variables in Designing LCPs
The political, economic, and technical circumstances that influence the
development of a country’s petroleum sector will naturally vary between
countries. Nonetheless, there are certain similarities of issues that have a
bearing on LCPs and their impact on the sector.
A. Control of natural resources
Countries have the right to exercise permanent sovereignty over the
resources within their borders.51 A threshold question is often how to
determine who controls the territory in which a given petroleum resource is
found. Investors can rightfully be expected to be leery of risking their
capital on costly and time-consuming exploration and development until
they know who owns the petroleum in question. This question comprises
several layers, one of which is the delimitation of (maritime) boundaries.
Licensing and development of North Sea oil and gas resources, for
example, began only after Denmark, Norway, and the UK resolved their
competing territorial claims.52 Once the question of territorial sovereignty is
51. See generally note 20 and the discussion therein.
52. Norskpetroleum, Norway’s Petroleum History, NORWEGIAN PETROLEUM (2017)
http://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/framework/norways-petroleum-history/. By contrast,
exploration off the coast of Cyprus has been slowed by disputes between the Turkish and
Cypriot governments. See e.g., Michele Kambas, Standoff in high seas as Cyprus says
Turkey blocks gas drill ship, REUTERS, (February 11, 2018) https://www.reuters.com/
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resolved, the next layer concerns ownership of and control over subsurface
resources. This could be addressed in primary or secondary legislation. The
Norwegian parliament, for example, enacted legislation vesting the state
with rights to exploration and exploitation of offshore petroleum resources;
the UK followed a similar path as the Crown owns and (through the
government) manages its oil and gas resources via hydrocarbon
legislation.53 Other countries, like Brazil, explicitly claim state ownership
of oil and gas resources via their national constitution, sometimes as well as
through petroleum legislation.54
The mechanisms by which countries exercise their control over
hydrocarbon resources vary. Brazilian national oil company Petrobras, for
example, exercised the country’s monopoly rights to petroleum for over 40
years before new legislation amended the constitution and created a
hydrocarbon law permitting direct contracts between the state and private
entities.55 In some countries, like Angola, government entities share
article/us-cyprus-natgas-turkey-ship/standoff-in-high-seas-as-cyprus-says-turkey-blocks-gasdrill-ship-idUSKBN1FV0X5.
53. Government of Norway, 1963, Act of 21 June 1963 Relating to Exploration and
Exploitation of Submarine Natural Resources (Submarine Resources Act).
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/NOR_1963_Act.
pdf. Government of the United Kingdom, 1964, The UK Continental Shelf Act,
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1964/29/section/1 (last visited on 17 January 2018).
54. The Brazilian constitution gives the state ownership of “the mineral resources,
including those of the subsoil.” See Government of Brazil, 2010. Constituicao Federal [C.F.]
[Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil] 3d. Ed., Art. 20. (Braz.)
http://english.tse.jus.br/arquivos/federal-constitution (last visited March 30, 2018). The
Angolan constitution uses even more comprehensive language, granting the state ownership
of all “solid, liquid and gaseous natural resources existing in the soil and subsoil, in
territorial waters, in the exclusive economic zone and in the continental shelf.” See Republic
of Angola, 2010. Constitution of the Republic of Angola, Article 16.
http://publicofficialsfinancialdisclosure.worldbank.org/sites/fdl/files/assets/law-libraryfiles/Angola_Constitution_2010_en.pdf (last visited May 22, 2018).
55. ANP (undated). “Legislation for Exploration and Production of Oil and Natural
Gas.” http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/Brazil,%20Exploration%20and%20Production%20
of%20Oil%20&%20Gas%20Legislation.pdf (last visited April 22, 2018). The legislation
created two new institutions to regulate the petroleum sector: the National Energy Policy
Council (Conselho Nacional de Politica Energética (CNPE)) and the National Agency of
Petroleum, Natural Gas, and Biofuels (Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e
Biocombustíveis (ANP)); but the decades of dominance by Petrobras mean that it still wields
considerable market share and thus economic power. Wharton School of Business, 2003.
“Now 50, Petrobras, the Brazilian National Oil Company, Has Aged Well.”
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/now-50-petrobras-the-brazilian-national-oilcompany-has-aged-well/ (last visited March 30, 2018).
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regulatory control with the national oil company.56 Whatever their method,
nations typically insist on keeping control of their petroleum resources and
retain the power to impose further conditions before entrusting any rights to
oil and gas companies.57 Whether the host nation’s authority is categorized
as ownership or as an outgrowth of sovereignty and regardless of what
entity is chosen to exercise that authority, the practical result is that any
company interested in obtaining rights to explore for and/or produce
petroleum must abide by the obligations imposed by the LCPs of the host
nation.58
B. National focus on petroleum
Although petroleum is a valuable commodity, its discovery does not
automatically translate into an economic bonanza, and the host nation must
still determine whether to make building a petroleum industry a national
priority. The presence of petroleum in the North Sea, for example, was
known for about a decade before development began in earnest in the 1970s
despite the UK government having started issuing exploration and
production licenses as early as 1964.59 The initial pace of development was
slow as nations adjoining the North Sea had little to no local experience in
offshore petroleum operations (and, at first, little incentive to gain it either
due to secure crude supply sources elsewhere in the world).60
Early work in the North Sea was dominated by foreign companies. 61 By
1970, however, as the potential of the region became clearer, nations
adjoining the new oil and gas provinces began crafting and updating their
national policies for petroleum development. The Norwegian government,
56. Lucy Corkin, After the Boom: Angola’s Recurring Oil Challenges in a New Context,
at 12 OXFORD INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY STUDIES (May 2017) https://www.oxfordenergy.
org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/After-the-Boom-Angolas-Recurring-OilChallenges-in-a-New-Contect-WPM-72.pdf.
57. See e.g, Government of Norway, 1963. “Act of 21 June 1963 Relating to
Exploration and Exploitation of Submarine Natural Resources.” http://www.un.org/
depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/NOR_1963_Act.pdf, para 2: “The
King may give Norwegian or foreign persons, including institutions, companies and other
associations, the right to explore or exploit natural resources. Specific conditions for such
permission may be stipulated.”
58. However, the host nation must be aware that these obligations might reduce the
attractiveness of doing business in that country.
59. Earle Marshall, North Sea Gas Discoveries, 22, No. 6 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 139 (1966).
60. Tideman et al. supra, note 39, at 10. See also N.J. Smith, Industrial Policy: Lessons
from the North Sea, 10 No. 2 Civitas Rev. 1, 3 (Dec. 2013).
61. Smith, supra note 60, at 3.
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for example, undertook a comprehensive reorganization of its petroleum
industry bureaucracy in 1970, shortly after the discovery of the massive
Ekofisk field.62 By 1972, Norway had two new agencies to deal with
administrative aspects of oilfield development: a Division for Petroleum
and Mining (initially created within the Ministry of Industry, but eventually
spun off as a separate ministry) and the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
(NPD).63 Norway also created a national oil company, Den Norske Stats
Oljeselskap A/S (Statoil, now Equinor) to run the country’s petroleum
business operations and ensure Norway received the maximum benefit from
its petroleum resources.64 Similarly, concerned that its initial ad hoc
approach to granting licenses was not capturing enough benefit from its
nascent offshore petroleum activities, the UK established the Offshore
Supplies Office (OSO) to monitor local oil and gas development.65 The
OSO was authorized to intervene in procurement processes of IOCs by, for
example, obtaining information on upcoming tenders, establishing criteria
for bid evaluations, and suggesting additional national/local bidders.66 It
became, in effect, a single point of contact for (mainly) foreign companies
seeking to participate in UK offshore oil and gas procurement processes.
The OSO and NPD brought focus to their respective nations’ petroleum
efforts, helping them develop and enforce ambitious LCPs and both nations
eventually developed successful petroleum industries making significant
contributions to their domestic economies. In the UK, “British content” in
the North Sea oil sector increased from about 40% in 1974 to over 80% in
1986,67 and the petroleum industry became the country’s largest industrial
sector, at its peak supporting employment of 450,000 people and generating
several billions of pounds in exports and other economic activity each

62. Norskpetroleum, supra note 52; see also NORWEGIAN PETROLEUM DIRECTORATE,
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate History, (May 15, 2009) http://www.npd.no/en/Aboutus/Organisation/History/.
63. Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, supra note 62.
64. Id. See also Helge Ryggvik, The Norwegian Oil Experience: A toolbox for
managing resources?, UNIVERSITY OF OSLO CENTRE FOR TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION, AND
CULTURE at 41 (2010) www.sv.uio.no/tik/forskning/publikasjoner/tik-rapportserie/
Ryggvik.pdf.
65. Id. at 12; Smith, supra note 60, at 5.
66. Id. at 5–6.
67. Scotland Sunday Herald, Vital role of the offshore supplies, THE HERALD (Jun. 21,
1989), http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/11918908.Vital_role_of_the_offshore_supplies/.
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year.68 Norway became the world’s third-largest exporter of natural gas and
eighth-largest exporter of crude oil; petroleum now accounts for roughly
47% of the total value of Norway’s exports,69 and Norwegian companies
are some of the world’s leading providers of high-tech oil services to other
countries.70
Policymakers must consider timing and general market conditions when
they wish to create a domestic petroleum sector, including the
establishment of a national oil company, national petroleum agency and
petroleum-related goods and services. As noted above, some commentators
have suggested that local content regimes like those established by riparian
petroleum-producing states to the North Sea (such as Norway, the UK,
Denmark and The Netherlands) were able to thrive in part due to the thenexisting high oil prices and the fact that political uncertainty in fuel supply
made abiding by such rules more palatable or, at least, not intolerable.71
Conversely, low oil prices and secure supplies may diminish the leverage
otherwise enjoyed by petroleum-wealthy nations to impose and enforce
robust LCPs. Host nations should, therefore, balance their expectations
against a realistic view of market conditions and design their policies
accordingly.
Therefore, timing and general market conditions likely play pivotal roles
in the development of any new petroleum sector. Nonetheless, experience
suggests that host nations can enhance their prospects for success by
creating national agencies with a clear focus on the new industry, without
conflict of interest if such role is performed by a NOC, and on reaping its
benefits for the host country.
C. Policymaking process
Methods for creating LCPs run the spectrum from the informal and
highly discretionary approach initially used by the UK prior to creation of
the OSO, to more formal and structured models like that later favored by
Norway, where over a year of parliamentary work and discussion preceded
68. UK Department for International Trade, Guidance for UK companies involved in the
oil and gas sector on exporting overseas, GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM (2016)
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/oil-and-gas-sector-export-help.
69. Norwegian Petroleum, Exports of oil and gas, NORWEGIAN PETROLEUM (2017)
http://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/production-and-exports/exports-of-oil-and-gas/.
70. Tideman, et al., supra note 44, at 10.
71. See e.g., Per Heum, Local Content Development – experiences from oil and gas
activities in Norway, at 13 NORWEGIAN INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS AND
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (Feb. 2008) https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/handle/11250/166156.
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the creation of the NPD. Historically, certain countries used to place
responsibility for crafting LCPs in the hands of business entities rather than
the government: in Nigeria, for example, the national oil company NNPC
(Nigerian National Petroleum Company) was initially given authority to
issue directives for “Nigerian Content,”72 while in Brazil, Mexico and Iran,
Petrobras, Pemex and NIOC (National Iranian Oil Company), respectively,
took the lead by virtue of their exercise of their respective state’s
constitutional monopoly over oil and gas resources. However, as later
regulatory reforms abolished some of these monopolies, the situation in
most of these countries has since changed.
In scenarios where LCPs are designed and implemented by government
officials, there is at least a theoretical measure of public accountability: if
the policies are inept or plagued by overt corruption, they eventually may
harm the officials and their political masters. This can, however, be
complicated by high levels of discretion, which are not always conducive to
transparency, and by overly-ambiguous rules that can make all but the most
egregious cases of malfeasance difficult to expose and correct. Moreover,
there is no guarantee that officeholders and civil servants will be
sufficiently well prepared, far-sighted or even available in sufficient
numbers to craft the best policies, no matter how transparent and inclusive
the rule-making process. Nonetheless, provided the officials are truly
accountable to the public, badly-designed and badly-implemented policies
are more likely to be corrected – either by the officials themselves, if they
get a chance, or their successors.
By contrast, in scenarios where LCPs are crafted by corporate officials,
accountability to the public is arguably either nonexistent or highly
attenuated, lessening pressures to fine-tune the policies or to make more
drastic changes, if necessary. In addition, LCPs created by company
directives may lack enforceability. A good example for this is Nigeria,
where – absent the force of law – the NNPC directives made little progress
toward their ambitious goals.73 Finally, the risks of conflicts of interest are
72. Ugwushi Bellema Ihua, Local Content Policy and SMEs Sector Promotion: The
Nigerian Oil Industry Experience, 5 No. 5 INT’L J. OF BUS. AND MGMT. 3, 5 (May 2010)
(available for download at http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ijbm/article/view/5435)
(Defined as the “quantum composite value added or created in the Nigerian economy
through the utilization of Nigerian human and material resources for the provision of goods
and services to the petroleum industry.”). See also Ovadia, note 73.
73. The initial NNPC targets called for 70% Nigerian content levels by 2010; but two
years before the deadline, the company acknowledged that the levels were only about half
that, and media sources reported far more dismal levels in the 5-20% range. Id. at 72; see
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heightened when market participants are given authority to regulate the
market as well. In summary, corporate-driven policies may be well-crafted
by persons with expertise in the field, but they are not without drawbacks of
their own.
A last question in this area relates to the impact of direct input by civil
society: are countries that (1) are clear on their policy goals, (2) present
these goals coherently, and (3) consult over them with the public, ultimately
more successful in achieving their goals than other countries? Given the
disparity in circumstances between countries and market conditions that
affect adoption and implementation of LCPs, there may be no clear answer
to this. However, policies written for broad public consultation might well
be subject to a more careful and analytical drafting and vetting process than
those policies where no public input is sought. They may also benefit from
factual issues or concerns being raised by public comment that might have
otherwise been overlooked, as well as additional scrutiny once public
comments are received.
D. Policy content
Just as there are many ways to create policies, there are many different
options for policy content. All petroleum industry LCPs seek to promote
local involvement in oil and gas activities for the benefit of one or more
sectors of the local economy; but there are at least as many different ways
to pursue that goal as there are countries with petroleum reserves. Initial
policies were free-form affairs, with little structure to guide the IOCs’ in
their compliance: the early LCP regime in the UK, for example, was a
discretionary licensing system to favor companies willing to commit to
rapid growth and use of UK-based suppliers, without formal targets or
methods for measuring progress.74 In this system, prospective licensees are
incentivized to submit the best possible package of benefits to surpass the
competition and, at least in theory, this may lead to a broader offering of
benefits to the host nation. However, such schemes may result in a
mismatch where the benefits on offer, while attractive, do not meet any
particular public need. Corruption may also become an issue: it may be
cheaper for an international company to offer a benefit to the relevant
also Jesse Ovadia, Measurement and Implementation of Local Content in Nigeria – A
Framework for Working with Stakeholders to Increase the Effectiveness of Local Content
Monitoring and Development, at 5 FACILITY FOR OIL SECTOR TRANSPARENCY IN NIGERIA
(Jan. 2013) http://cpparesearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/FOSTER-Measurementand-Implementation-of-Local-Content.pdf.
74. Klueh, supra note 17, at 7.
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government official involved in the evaluation of bids than to provide value
to the wider public.
A structured system of LCPs to encourage use of locally-sourced goods
and services without explicit numerical targets can be implemented as a
midway alternative between pure discretion and a rigid system of quotas.
This includes, for example, policies that impose preferences for local
vendors and/or employees, provided they meet quality criteria that place
them within a certain range of the lowest-priced foreign sources. Norway,
for example, decreed in 1972 that oil and gas licensees would have to
include Norwegian contractors in invitations for tenders to the extent they
produced goods or services of the kind required. The decree further
required use of Norwegian goods and services to the extent competitive
with foreign goods and services in terms of quality, service, schedule of
delivery, and price.75 Such policies can be weighted and implemented in a
variety of fashions. Angola, for example, requires preferential consideration
for Angolan companies in contracts and subcontracts, “provided that the
amount of the respective proposal is not more than 10% higher than that
proposed by other companies.”76 Kazakhstan imposes a statutory discount
requiring a company tendering a contract for bids to “reduce the price of the
bids submitted by those tender participants that are Kazakhstan producers
by twenty percent.”77 In most of these schemes, companies are expected to
buy and hire locally, with the proviso that the local content must meet
certain minimum standards. It is not difficult, however, to envisage
scenarios in which these standards are expressed in terms that effectively
mandate foreign goods and expatriates – or exclude them – and thus
undermine the flexibility that makes these forms of LCPs attractive. It also
creates an environment where it becomes very difficult for local companies
to compete on an “equal footing”. Moreover, policing these rules may be
difficult and lack transparency, which can encourage favoritism and lead to
corruption.
75. See generally, Perrine Toledano, Sophie Thomashausen and Suzhe Jia eds., Local
Content: Norway – Petroleum, COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT ,
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/03/Local-Content-Norway-Petroleum-CCSI-May2016.pdf.
76. Angolan Ministry of Petroleum (Sonangol translation), General Regulatory
Framework for Hiring of Services and Goods from National Companies by Companies in
the Oil Industry, (2003) at Article 6, http://www.sonangol.co.ao/Style%20Library/ptpt/Pdf/licitacoes/laws_order127_en.pdf (last visited January 21, 2019).
77. Government of Kazakhstan, Law on Subsoil and Subsoil Use, at Article 78 (2010)
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/kaz_e/WTACCKAZ69_LEG_3.pdf
(last
visited January 21, 2019).
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Some nations opt for policies that are setting numerical targets which can
either be expressed in affirmative terms as quotas that must be reached, or
in negative terms as ceilings that cannot be breached. Indonesia’s
regulations for the petroleum sector, for example, include detailed
schedules specifying local content targets as a percentage of total
expenditures in each category of activity, with quotas increasing with the
passage of time. The schedules include targets for specific activities and for
broad categories of work: in off-shore drilling, the target is 45% local
content (abbreviated from the Indonesian as “TKDN”) for each year in the
period 2017-2020, rising to 55% TKDN annually in the period 2021-2025;
while for on-shore drilling, the goals are 70% per annum during 2017-2020
and 90% thereafter.78 Some nations utilize a mix of positive and negative
targets: Angola, for example, requires entities covered by the country’s
LCPs (which includes essentially all IOCs) to fill positions in Angola with
“Angolan citizens duly qualified.” Hiring expatriates requires prior
authorization of the Ministry of Petroleum for which the company seeking
to make the hire must demonstrate that “there are not sufficient and
available Angolan citizens with the skills and experience required for the
exercise of office or position in question.”79 Foreign workers may comprise
no more than 30% of a foreign company’s total workforce in Angola.80
Numerical targets may be simple to enact and, at least in theory, easy to
understand and enforce. However, the greater the level of specificity, the
more difficult it may be to reach the quotas: a specific target may turn out
to be out of reach, leaving a company that is otherwise complying in breach
of the rules and subject to sanction. For the regulators, auditing complex
rules may prove expensive or infeasible. Even when the rules are easy to
enforce and to follow, there is no guarantee they will produce the desired
result without careful drafting. A simple preference for local goods without
adequate regard to quality or suitability, for example, may inadvertently
cause more harm than good by making petroleum activities inefficient,
78. Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, Regulation No. 15/2013, Utilization of
Domestic Products in Upstream Oil and Natural Gas Business Activities, Attachment 1
(2013) http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/ins128474.pdf (last visited January 21, 2019).
79. Angolan Ministry of Interior, Application of recruitment, integration, training and
Angolan personal development and the hiring of foreign personnel for the execution of oil
operations in Angola, at Articles 5 and 8 (2010) http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/
January%202016/Angola%20Law%20Decree%20(Local%20Content).pdf
(last
visited
January 21, 2019).
80. Government of Angola, 2017. Presidential Decree 43/17, at Articles 5 and 11
https://www.extractiveshub.org/servefile/getFile/id/4195 (last visited January 21, 2019).
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reducing profitability, and driving away investors. Conversely, sheltering
quotas for local goods and services may slow down development of
efficient processes and thus never allow the domestic companies to compete
on an equal footing with international firms. Therefore, certain flexibility is
required if a host nation desires to use quotas and a proper assessment
should be made before establishing those quotas in the first place.
In addition to overt rules, countries sometimes implement policies that
do not explicitly take up the cause of supporting local content, but
indirectly have the same effect. Angola, for example, requires workers to be
paid in Angolan currency: this puts money into circulation for the local
economy.81 They also tend to favor local hires, who need not worry about
currency exchange rates and can, therefore, take full advantage of their pay.
Norway prescribed petroleum contracts and other essential documents to be
written in Norwegian, and also required fluency in that language for
employment on offshore drilling platforms.82 Although such rules are
theoretically neutral – anyone can learn to speak a new language – they
nonetheless tend to advantage local hires and professional services
companies like law firms, contract management companies, and
accountants. The language requirement encouraged foreign companies to
set up operational entities in Norway in which Norwegians played key
roles, thereby promoting transfer of capital investment as well as
knowledge and expertise.83 Finally, LCPs can be structured to promote
overall capacity building and civic improvements, as is the case in
Indonesia where local content scoring can be increased by up to 15%
TKDN based on contributions to community development or providing
after-sales service facilities in country.84
E. Enforcement
Even the best-designed policies are of little value without an effective
enforcement mechanism to support them. Whatever their long-term value to
the host nation, LCPs may turn out to be more or less economically-

81. Id. at x.
82. Ryggvik, supra note 64.
83. Ryggvik, supra note 64, at 59. It is worth noting that a similar local-language
requirement in the UK would unlikely have had the same impact, because so much of the
international oil industry was already (and continues to be) tied to other English-speaking
countries, particularly the US. This is an example of how a useful LCP in one country might
be ineffective in another.
84. Tordo, supra note 7, at 58.
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efficient from the perspective of an IOC and its immediate financial
interests. Incentives to cheat or to game the system abound.
LCP enforcement may be policed by governmental agencies that happen
to have jurisdiction over petroleum resources (such as a national energy
ministry) or by agencies specifically tasked with enforcement of local
content rules. Alternatively, contractual provisions embodying local content
rules may be subject to enforcement by courts of general jurisdiction,
provided those courts have (or can obtain) the expertise necessary to
interpret the relevant provisions.
During the early days of North Sea petroleum development, host nations
relied on informal enforcement systems. In the UK, for example, no legal
sanctions were imposed on companies with low levels of “British content”
in their activities or supply chain but it was generally understood that such
companies would face difficulty in future bidding rounds.85 In Norway,
R&D partnerships sought by the government for its nascent petroleum
industry were “made a crucial and determining factor in the licensing
process by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy.”86 As noted earlier,
however, both the UK and Norway concluded that monitoring petroleum
sector activities to ensure compliance was essential to the success of their
LCPs. Other nations have drawn similar conclusions: in Nigeria, for
example, “promotion of Nigerian content development” is “a major
criterion” for award of licenses, permits and other interests in the Nigerian
petroleum sector.87 A new agency, the Nigerian Content Development and
Monitoring Board, collects and audits industry data to verify compliance
with the country’s LCPs.88 Brazil outsources monitoring to third parties
accredited to undertake that role by Brazil’s national petroleum agency
under specific rules and guidance.89
Monitoring compliance is just part of the enforcement puzzle. Nations
use sanctions and rewards to punish noncompliance and encourage good
85. Klueh, supra note 17, at 41.
86. IQPC, Norway: A Local Content Success Story, OIL & GAS IQ (Mar. 25, 2010)
https://www.oilandgasiq.com/strategy-management-and-information/articles/norway-alocal-content-success-story.
87. Government of Nigeria (2010). “Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content
Development Act” (NOGIC), Article 3. http://ncdmb.gov.ng/images/GUIDELINES/NCACT
.pdf (last visited March 10, 2018).
88. Id. at 7-10.
89. See “Brazil local content: brief regulatory considerations” in Eduardo G. Pereira,
ed., Luiz Izu, Giovani Loss and Fernando Gregio Ludke, Brazilian Upstream Oil and Gas: A
practical Guide to the Law and Regulation (Globe Law and Business 2nd ed. 2016).
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behavior. In Nigeria, for example, operators, contractors, and
subcontractors who fail to comply with the local content requirements may
be fined up to 5% of the project sum for each project in which the offence is
committed or face cancellation of the project.90 Similarly, companies
engaged in petroleum activities in Indonesia that fail to meet the TKDN
levels specified in their contracts are subject to sanctions, including fines or
revocation of their permit to engage in further activities.91 In Angola, fines
can be imposed on noncompliant firms and companies with unpaid fines are
ineligible for new contracts, and contracts that violate the local content
rules can be declared null and void.92 On the other hand, some governments
might provide incentives for higher compliance with the country’s LCPs.93
By rewarding compliance rather than simply punishing noncompliance,
such a government may be able to create a positive climate of cooperation
and in the end reap the benefit of behavior that exceeds expectations.
Such systems of rewards and sanctions seem logical and may be
effective; but they pose challenges of their own. For sanctions, for example,
at what level should the fines be set? Too low, and the penalties risk
becoming an accepted “cost of doing business” rather than effective tools
for securing compliance; too high, and foreign companies may choose to do
business elsewhere. Worse, some companies may look for alternative
methods of avoiding compliance, including attempting to bribe regulatory
officials. Rewards for good behavior must be fine-tuned as well to avoid the
risk of the host government “giving away” more than necessary to secure
the benefits intended by the policies in question.

90. NOGIC, supra note 87, at 68. The term “project sum” and methods for calculating it
are, however, not defined.
91. Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2013. Regulation No.
15/2013, “Utilization of Domestic Products in Upstream Oil and Natural Gas Business
Activities,” Attachment 1. extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/ins128474.pdf Articles 21-23 (last
visited May 18, 2018); see also Tordo, supra note 7, at 46.
92. Perrine Toledano, Jacky Mandelbaum and Sophie Thomashausen, eds., Local
content: Angola – petroleum, COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/03/Local-Content-Angola-petroleum-CCSI-July-2014.pdf (last visited January 21, 2019).
93. See HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS, The New Iranian Petroleum Contract—Government
Approval, (Aug. 9, 2016) https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/hsfpdf/latest-thinking/thenew-iranian-petroleum-contract-–-government-approval?pdf=1; see also James Dallas et al.,
Iran: New Model Iranian Petroleum Contract, MONDAQ (Apr. 11, 2016)
http://www.mondaq.com/x/481064/Oil+Gas+Electricity/New+Model+Iranian+Petroleum+C
ontract.
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The initial approach by the UK and Norway, which considered
companies’ historical levels of compliance when evaluating their bids for
new work, may ensure more cooperation in the long run but such
evaluations can be complex and difficult to perform. Countries that lack
prior experience in petroleum exploration and development, or that have
had relatively inactive petroleum sectors, may also lack personnel with
sufficient expertise to detect noncompliance. International companies may
choose to perform some activities outside the host nation’s jurisdiction to
avoid scrutiny by regulators, route some of their business through shell
companies or other entities to make it difficult to identify the ultimate
beneficiaries, or simply change the ownership of the companies
participating in each separate bid or project.
The host country’s national oil company may employ (or contract for)
personnel with the expertise necessary to detect such subterfuge, if it exists.
As noted earlier, however, where the national oil company as a market
participant takes on the role of market regulator, special care must be taken
lest its immediate business interests conflict with wider national goals. In
some countries, the national oil company may become more powerful than
the government ministries to which it answers: 94 without clear rules to
avoid conflicts of interest, inefficiency and the risk of outright corruption
are heightened.95 Independent regulatory agencies may be better placed to
withstand market attractions; but the question then becomes how much
independence can be tolerated. In Indonesia, the former oil and gas
regulator BPMIGAS was challenged as being far too independent of the
framework of national law and accountability.96 Fundamentally, any form
of regulation over a complex and lucrative industry like the petroleum
industry can be corrupted and must be subject to scrutiny and ongoing
review.
F. Institutional coordination and stability
Crucial though it may be to a host nation’s economic future, the
petroleum sector cannot be viewed in isolation. Countries seeking to
94. Corkin, supra note 56, at 12.
95. Frances Coppola, Cobalt International Energy: Oil, Angola and Corruption,
FORBES (Aug. 17, 2014, 12:43 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2014/08/
17/cobalt-international-energy-sec-alleges-corruption-in-angolan-operations/#b70033d2a
5b9.
96. Perrine Toledano and Sophie Thomashausen, Local Content: Indonesia –
Petroleum, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV. http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/03/LocalContent-Indonesia-Petroleum-CCSI-Feb-2015.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2018).
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develop oil and gas resources must consider their overall economic
situation and national priorities, and craft LCPs consistent with the nation’s
other development policies.97 Specialty agencies like Norway’s GSO or the
UK’s OSO can be a valuable tool for monitoring progress of the nation’s
petroleum LCPs, if they are given the resources and authority needed to
gather relevant data. Such agencies may also be used to enforce the policies
through fines or incentives, and to make or recommend changes to the LCP
regime as needed. Coordination is essential to this task. Where the LCPs are
focused on building infrastructure like roads and ports, they must be
harmonized with the overall efforts of the country’s transportation ministry.
If the host country needs improved schools, the education ministry must be
involved; and so on. Although the national oil company may have enough
expertise to run the petroleum sector, this does not guarantee that it will
have the institutional knowledge or incentives to work with such a broad
spectrum of government activities.98 An agency independent of the national
oil company may be better able to operate as regulator and intermediator in
coordinating various aspects of national policy.
LCPs may not produce immediate or obvious improvements in the
quality of life of the host nation’s wider population: this may be the case,
for example, when the government requires investment in local R&D or
capacity building such as making management training available to a wider
number of participants. In such cases, the host government needs to be able
to engage in long-term strategic planning (and to command the support of
its people) to nevertheless achieve the full benefit from its policies. This
means, in part, for the government to be able to adhere to policies that are
making headway, even if they do not produce immediate results. Given the
large up-front costs that are often required in exploration and development
of petroleum resources, investors are likely to seek stability in the
regulatory regime.99 Unfortunately, those countries that most require longterm investments in human capital are likely to be those where prosperity is
97. Tordo, supra note 7, at xiii.
98. Despite Sonangol’s expertise in the petroleum business, for example, it has been
subject to criticism for failing to coordinate its regulatory efforts with other government
agencies, limiting the effectiveness of Angola’s LCPs. See Elijah Dickens Mushemeza and
John Okiira, Local Content Frameworks in the African Oil and Gas Sector: Lessons from
Angola and Chad, at 22-24 EVIDENCE AND LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA (Apr. 2016),
http://ella.practicalaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/REP-ACODE-Local-ContentFrameworks-in-the-African-Oil-and-Gas.pdf (last visited January 21, 2019).
99. Indeed, regulatory uncertainty is often cited as a disincentive to investment. See e.g.
IEA, supra note 4, at 65.
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most lacking, and where public patience is in shortest supply. Public
participation, as noted above, may help governments secure the support
they need to implement long-term strategies, provided the right tools and
mechanisms are in place to allow such participation and to monitor its
implementation.
G. Other variables
Finally, a nation’s choice of policies should be informed by the presence
of any special factors that might affect the development of its petroleum
resources. Norway’s success in the North Sea, for example, rested in part
on world economic circumstances, including the (1) general downturn of
business worldwide in the 1970s, which left financiers without traditional
markets to invest in; (2) rise of oil prices in the same period, which made
Norway a lucrative investment target; and (3) relative lack of expertise in
offshore production throughout the oil industry, which opened up space for
newcomers to break into this specialized area.100 These extrinsic factors
served to make the timing of Norway’s oil and gas “extremely perfect for
mobilizing what was needed to develop local industrial competence that
could become competitive by international standards.”101
Intrinsic factors can play a role as well. Regulations requiring use of the
local language, as were imposed in Norway, may advantage domestic firms
in a country with a single language not commonly spoken abroad. Yet, the
same requirement may complicate work in a country with a patchwork of
local languages or have little impact at all in a country like the UK, whose
native tongue is widely spoken in other oil-producing countries. Economic
and political circumstances comprise a blend of external and internal
factors: as noted above, the UK had a conveniently-underutilized skilled
work force available at the time the need to develop the North Sea
petroleum deposits became apparent, and, despite difficulties in the years
after World War II, the country continued to be an economic power to be
reckoned with.102 By contrast, domestic strife in Angola and Nigeria
destroyed or rendered unavailable much of their local work force and

100. Heum, supra note 71, at 13.
101. Id.
102. At the beginning of the 1970s the UK was the world’s third-largest exporter of
industrial goods and it remained in the top five throughout the next two decades. UK
Government Office for National Statistics, UK Trade April 2016, OFFICE FOR NATIONAL
STATISTICS (UK) (Jun. 9, 2016) https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balance
ofpayments/bulletins/uktrade/apr2016.
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wreaked havoc on their industrial infrastructure.103 The bottom line remains
that there is, and can be, no “one size fits all” strategy for development and
consequently no single LCP approach that could infallibly maximize the
value added to a host nation’s economy.
IV. Ongoing Concerns and Challenges for Developing Countries
Before starting the design of LCPs, a government would do well to
analyze the likely costs and benefits of all industrial development policies
that may otherwise be available to it.104 Even if a decision has then been
taken in favor of imposing local content requirement(s), careful
consideration should continue to be given to the individual features of the
adopted policy/ies. Once granted, special privileges “tend to become
engrained and politically difficult to remove even in cases where their
sustainability is in doubt.”105 Strategies so entrenched tend to survive long
beyond their usefulness and, in the end, often hurt the very people they
were meant to help.106
Other key concerns that need to be addressed when designing LCPs
include the type of measures they will be based on. This may include an
assertive quota-based approach such as Indonesia’s or Brazil’s percentage
targets and timetables, or encouraging an incentives-based approach like
Indonesia’s inclusion of local community development efforts in evaluating
competing bids. Finally, there is a need for policies to be set in a transparent
and all-inclusive manner at realistic, achievable levels with the goal of
creating true value addition and competitiveness in the host nation. These
concerns are further explored below.

103. According to some commentators, Nigerian crude oil production dropped by nearly
two-thirds between during the war. See e.g. Mary Ikande, History of crude oil in Nigeria,
LEGIT (2017) https://www.naija.ng/1119014-history-crude-oil-nigeria.html#1119014.
104. An example of an industrial development policy other than local content is “importsubstitution-industrialization” where certain key sectors, such as manufacturing, are
protected from imports. The selective protection of these sectors allows them to develop,
adapt and become (more) competitive without being exposed to international market
pressure. As soon as the relevant sector has ‘caught up’ and become sufficiently competitive,
however, the protectionist measure(s) ought to be removed as the artificially sheltered
environment they provide may otherwise work against further sector advancement. See A.
de Lima-Campos, 2013. “Local Content Requirements in the Oil and Gas Sector.” LimaCampos supra, note #..
105. Tordo, supra note 7, at 58.
106. Id.
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A. The importance of value addition and competitiveness
Some authors have suggested that the general approach to local content
in developing countries appears to be based on an assumption that domestic
companies already have the necessary capabilities to supply the required
goods and services, but somehow “suffer from a demand bias against
sourcing locally”107 that seems to be inherent in foreign investors. LCPs in
these countries, therefore, “tend to focus more on using legislative
mandates to transfer economic activity towards”108 companies that tick the
‘being local’ box, whether by name, place of incorporation or the identity of
their shareholders.
While these governments may believe that a mere enforcement of local
ownership quotas is either identical with, or will infallibly lead to, capacity
building (which is often where the real need in developing countries lies),
true capacity building would ideally involve the creation and improvement
of basic managerial, technical and operational skills and the development of
vocational training programs for the benefit of the wider domestic
population.
There are many factors that may contribute to a country’s skills gap. For
example, in order to have a positive impact on local employment in a
particular sector of the economy an LCP may first need to focus on
improving the standards of that country’s general education system and/or
adjusting labor mobility, and create the necessary means to accomplish that
mobility.109 In fact, LCPs need to be viewed in light of the broader
obstacles that industrialization in many developing countries faces. Apart
from raising educational standards, the increase in local content will often
depend on significant improvements being made to, for example, public
transport and road infrastructure to allow people to travel to educational
and/or vocational training and work centers. Improvements are often also
required to public security to make women and young girls feel safe enough
to undertake journeys, or live, away from home. More generally,
improvements may also be needed in the way business is done in the
relevant country, and the levels of bureaucracy, transparency in general
business practices, corruption, and access to financing that exists.110
107. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Local Content
Requirements and the Green Economy, at 11 UNCTAD (2014) http://unctad.org/en/
PublicationsLibrary/ditcted2013d7_en.pdf.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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The choice of LCPs and the measures that those policies attempt to
implement to plug any gaps that may exist should then, logically, be
designed to address the nature and level of these gaps, rather than to create
a one-for-all approach by mandating minimum quotas, for example, for
domestic employment obligations and training budgets.111 Policies that are
primarily focused on compliance of foreign investors with quotas, rather
than approaching capacity building comprehensively as something that
should and will benefit the entire domestic economy, may therefore
compromise their own effectiveness.
Some host governments favor the redistribution away from foreign
investors of wealth that is created by industrial operations in the relevant
host countries, and the passing on of such wealth to those local
communities that were either actively involved in the creation of that
wealth in the first place or in whose vicinity and with whose resources that
wealth was created and who should, therefore, be entitled the most to reap
the benefits of such operations. However, it is arguably the gradual
reduction in the market power of large foreign investors that should be
targeted instead. If not, the indirect control foreign investors exert by
providing the income that is being redistributed in this way may, in effect,
make the local economy more dependent on them rather than encourage it
to stand on its own.112
Upon their introduction, protectionist measures such as LCPs, even if
they are well designed, are likely to use up resources rather than create
immediate value. The expenditure initially needed to get local content
measures successfully off the ground would, however, only be
economically justifiable for a country or a foreign investor to shoulder, if
111. Skills shortages across the hydrocarbon value chain are a well-known issue all over
the world. That will have two main consequences: foreign investors may struggle to meet
their own demands in relation to experienced expat technical, operational and/or managerial
staff so may share a host country’s interest in building a local workforce but may also face a
lack of available teachers and instructors to get such training under way. For examples on
effects such shortages have, see Joseph Green, How does the industry address its single
biggest challenge: the skills shortage?, ENERGY GLOBAL (Apr. 14, 2015)
https://www.energyglobal.com/upstream/exploration/14042015/industry-challenge-skillsshortage-leonard-607/; see also W. Chris Daum, Scott Duncan and Sabine Hoover, Skills
shortages in a booming market: The big oil and gas challenge, HYDROCARBON PROCESSING
(2014) http://www.hydrocarbonprocessing.com/blog/2014/06/skills-shortages-in-a-boomingmarket-the-big-oil-and-gas-challenge.
112. See e.g., Marine and Petroleum Nigeria, Nigerian Content Policy Suffers Under Low
Oil Prices, MARINE & PETROLEUM NIGERIA http://ww.w.marineandpetroleum.com/content/
nigerian-content-policy-suffers-under-low-oil-prices (last visited May 24, 2018).
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the ensuing efforts actually led to true capacity building, cost savings and,
therefore, value creation for all concerned, at least in the mid- to long-term.
Having said that, the high upfront capital requirements and needs of the
hydrocarbon sector for costly, complex technology, coupled with the
prolonged low oil price and subdued debt markets in which the industry
continuous to find itself, have caused the industry to become very cost
conscious. Global supply chains in the industry are designed to keep costs
down by buying high quality products in bulk orders from reliable suppliers
rather than to artificially inflate costs by including in supply tenders local
suppliers of unknown quality or reliability. And even if the foreign
investors were to take on such increased costs, they would likely do so in
the full knowledge and expectation that these costs are recoverable under
the local hydrocarbon production sharing regime or as a tax relief.
Consequently then, when designing LCPs in the petroleum sector,
policymakers need to be conscious of not inadvertently creating measures
for which that country’s costs of compliance actually exceed their public
benefit.113
If an increase in operational costs for foreign investors caused by virtue
of local content requirements will, in one way or another, be paid for by the
host country itself, it may make sense, at least in the context of some
countries, to design more intrusive measures aimed at subsidizing fledgling
home-grown companies until they are a more serious match for their
international competitors, rather than forcing foreign investors to comply
with often quite arbitrary quotas and other requirements resulting in an
increase in their costs and expenditure (which they most likely will charge
back to the host country).114 Other countries have created geographical and
sectoral clusters to hasten the establishment of domestic and/or regional
business centers and, at the same time, ensure their own technological
advancement.115
Having said that, the more complex LCPs become, the more difficult it
will usually be, on the one hand, for regulators to administer them
effectively but, on the other hand, for foreign investors to actually correctly
interpret and execute these policies in the first place. Increased complexity
113. For more discussion on this point, see Tordo et al., supra note 6.
114. This was part of the route the UK chose.
115. An example is Malaysia’s 2010 Economic Transformation Programme which sets
out a number of steps and actions the country is undertaking to convert itself into such a
regional and sectoral cluster. For further details, see Pemandu, 2010. “Economic
Transformation Programme.” https://policy.asiapacificenergy.org/sites/default/files/ETP.pdf
(last visited February 7, 2019).
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could also lead to increased administrative costs and may consequently
create a cash flow issue and, therefore, disadvantage smaller-sized foreign
investors, at least in the near term.116
B. The importance of transparency and of being inclusive
Impact and general acceptance of LCPs tend to be much increased, if the
process of policy formulation involves as many levels of government,
society and industry and the process itself is conducted in an as transparent
a manner, as possible.117 The process of LCP formulation should, therefore,
be based on considerations that include whether host government ministries
in charge of sectors other than the one in question (particularly trade,
commerce, finance and, if appropriate, agriculture) are actively encouraged
to contribute in the design of these policies in order to ensure that they will
have the widest possible impact on the host nation’s economy. Another
consideration is whether foreign investors will be allowed to participate in
the design of the LCPs and, if so, be able to input in a meaningful way on
the content of the proposed policy and/or any amendments to it. 118 As
mentioned before, it will of course be equally important to solicit input
from those who are supposed to benefit the most from the relevant
measures, i.e. the people of the affected local regions and other civil society
groups. This is why LCPs should be well-linked with CSR policies and
procedures. However, for any of these comments to be constructive they
should be made on an informed basis, so ongoing education by government
and local/national media, rather than alarmist reports or misinformation to
raise fears or false expectations amongst the public, is paramount.
The process of creating and administering LCPs and quotas must be
overseen by public “institution(s) with a clear, limited mandate.”119 The
statutory powers, duties and budgetary resources of these institution(s) as
116. This is unlikely to present an ongoing issue though because, as explained on the
previous page, in the petroleum sector administrative costs are normally recoverable under
the local petroleum sharing regime or as a loss that is offset against corporate gains.
117. This is very much a live topic in South Africa. See e.g., The Africa Report, South
Africa to publish contested mining charter by March, REUTERS (Feb. 6, 2017)
http://www.theafricareport.com/Southern-Africa/south-africa-to-publish-contested-miningcharter-by-march.html.
118. In the UK energy sector, stakeholder input is safeguarded by industry-wide
consultations and the relevant regulatory body will be accountable for the way in which it
dealt with any stakeholder input that it received as part of the consultation process. This is
enshrined in law. See e.g., OFFICE OF GAS AND ELECTRICITY MARKETS (UK), Consultations
Policy, (Nov. 6, 2018)) https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/consultations/consultations-policy.
119. For further details, look to UNCTAD, supra note 107, at 14.
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well as the limits within which they are meant to operate and that may
separate them from other parts of the wider government, such as national
oil companies, should be clearly defined. This last point will be particularly
important in those instances where the national oil company also carries out
the functions of a national regulatory entity, as is still the case in Angola.120
Management of local content is, even in developed countries, a highly
resource-intensive task. Therefore, the relevant institution(s) need to be
given sufficient manpower to be able to effectively carry out their mandate
in this respect and ensure that their staff has the requisite technical and
industry expertise to do so. All too often, however, the selection might be
made on the basis of a candidate’s political or social affiliation, which may
not be surprising in countries where political or social affiliates of members
of government or of the ruling class more generally are often the only
credible candidates in a host country to choose from.121 Decisions taken by
local content institution(s) should therefore be made subject to a judicial
review or transparent appeal’s process. Unfortunately, most resource
wealthy nations are not as well ranked in terms of transparency and antibribery practices as, for example, the UK, Norway and Canada.
C. The importance of realism
As mentioned before, perhaps the hardest task policymakers have to
tackle is designing and setting local content targets at the right level for the
relevant host country circumstances. This task is especially difficult in
countries where industrial capacity is unusually low and the socioeconomic expectation, and often resulting political pressure, demand quick
success stories from their local content measures. The decision of whether
to give in to these expectations and pressures is often particularly relevant
ahead of national elections when populist promises tend to overrule realistic
targets.
Instead of blindly going down the populist route, policymakers should
properly assess the relevant “barriers to local development” in their
countries and design “appropriate corrective measures, realistic policy
targets, and the metrics to monitor the effects of policy implementation.”122
They also need to address the question of how ‘local’ the local content in
120. This is still the case, for example, in Angola where Sonangol is also the country’s de
facto regulator in the petroleum sector. Sian Stephens, Sonangol: Angola’s Charm Offensive,
NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE (Mar. 2016) https://resourcegovernance.org/
sites/default/files/documents/sonangol-angolas-charm-offensive.pdf.
121. For a discussion on this point, look to UNCTAD, supra note 107, at 14.
122. For more discussion on this point, look to Tordo, supra note 7.
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question is meant to be, i.e. whether it should benefit the host nation as a
whole (i.e. be described as ‘national’ content) or focus on a particular
region. As previously pointed out, this process should, as a minimum,
involve those key ministries whose sectors are set to benefit from the local
content targets (and who will, therefore, likely strive for these targets to be
high), and the foreign investors who will be capable of a realistic evaluation
of what is achievable under the particular country’s setting and
circumstances (and who will likely try to put a damper on the government’s
high expectations). If the sources of input are too limited, the relevant
government targets will go unchallenged and remain purely aspirational and
often incapable of being accomplished due to, for example, the timespan
that would be required to bring domestic companies to a level at which they
were able to successfully compete in the international arena.123
It may also become challenging for policymakers to find a way in which
to manage widespread underachievement, if local content targets are
unattainably high. For a host government not to penalize non-compliance
could allow for capacity to build gradually but could also be seen as weak.
Choosing to penalize such behavior, however, by, for example,
disqualifying non-compliant foreign investors from future bidding rounds
or imposing on them financial penalties or even prison sentences124, can
communicate determination but may not actually solve the problem of the
subsisting lack of capacity building in the host country. Some countries
have, therefore, adopted systems in which local content requirements that
are too strenuous for a particular investor or investor class to fulfil can be
waived for them or can be waived under particular circumstances.125 As
123. For the example of Nigeria, see Joseph Nna Emeka Nwaokoro, 55 J. OF AFRICAN L.
128 (2011). Another example is Ghana. The First Schedule of the 2013 Petroleum (Local
Content and Local Participation in Petroleum Activities) Regulations requires that within 10
years up to 90% of “goods and services” that are tied to the petroleum sector be sourced
locally, and prescribe a minimum domestic employment level of up to 80% of all “technical
core staff” and 10% of all “other” staff within the same timeframe.
124. For example: Petroleum (Local Content and Local Participation in Petroleum
Activities) Regulations 2013 of Ghana, note 118, Section 46.
125. See the example of Brazil’s ambitious plan to construct 8 FPSOs domestically that
had grown out of the local content requirement for oil and gas operators in Brazil to source
up to 85% of equipment and services from within the country. This unachievably high target
has now resulted in the application for a waiver in respect of the FPSO for the Libra pre-salt
field. See e.g., WESTWOOD GLOBAL ENERGY GROUP, DW Monday: Not Content with Local
Content
https://www.westwoodenergy.com/news/westwood-insight/dw-monday-notcontent-with-local-content/ (last visited February 4, 2019); see also Michael Place, Brazil
debates local content waiver for Libra pre-salt pilot, BNAMERICAS (Feb. 9, 2017)
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always, care must be taken that such a waiver system does not actually
serve as an incentive “for corruption, particularly where the criteria for
evaluating waiver applications is not made public or is not applied in an
objective or transparent manner.”126
In addition, and as briefly mentioned above, the more unrealistic a target
and the more painful the penalty for not achieving it are, the stronger the
incentive may be amongst investors to circumvent that target. Ambiguity in
policy formulation, imprecise wording, or targets/quotas that lack clarity,
particularly in the question of which criteria have to be fulfilled by a
company for it to be regarded as “local” or “indigenous,” may benefit the
wrong people in this respect.127 Another issue is that all too often the only
“local” people who are in a position to own and manage assets or contribute
equity in a “local” company are the well-off and well-educated who tend to
be related, or at least close, to the ruling elite of that country thereby again
eclipsing the broader population for whose benefit the policies were or
should have been designed in the first place.128
Similar to devising a country’s fiscal regime in the extracting industries,
creating LCPs that can be adapted as and when domestic and international
markets and considerations change has proven to be a key to avoiding
unrealistic goals at any given time and at any stage of domestic sector
development. This can be done by including flexible targets (that self-adjust
in line with market changes) or by subjecting the relevant policies to
periodic reviews. The latter will require political resolve to actually carry
through a modification of local content requirements, if a need to do so is
indicated by the outcome of such reviews. This may be difficult to attain,
however, where the need is one for downward adjustment since this may be

https://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/brazil-debates-local-content-waiver-for-libra-pre-saltpilot.
126. UNCTAD, supra note 107, at 16.
127. For example, in Ghana to qualify as a Ghanaian/indigenous company, the company
must have at least 51% of its equity owned by a Ghanaian with 80% management and senior
positions occupied by Ghanaians. The legislation does not specify whether these Ghanaians
have to be residents of Ghana. Petroleum Commission, Ghana, 2015. “Local Content.”
https://www.petrocom.gov.gh/local-content/ (last visited February 7, 2019).
128. See e.g., Megan Zwiebel, Kevin Abikoff of Hughes Hubbard Discusses the Benefits
and Risks of African Local Content Laws, The FCPA Report (Feb. 10, 2016) (available for
download
at
https://www.hugheshubbard.com/news/kevin-abikoff-of-hughes-hubbarddiscusses-the-benefits-and-risks-of-african-local-content-laws).
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perceived as the host government backing down under the pressure of
foreign investors (and consequently is rather rare).129
In addition, governments should be careful before including local content
as a bid parameter to award a petroleum contract. Such rules could create a
perverse environment where bidders might be “encouraged” to improve
their bids with unrealistic local content conditions (e.g. bidding 85% or
more of goods and services to be local). In this hypothetical case, the said
bidder (i.e. concessionaire) might win the award of the petroleum contract
with terms they know are not realistic and later claim that the local market
cannot afford such conditions and ask for exemptions from having to fulfil
the terms of their own bid which would create a complex scenario between
breach of contract and unfair procedures vis-à-vis other bidders. This
scenario played out on several occasions in Brazil as past bid rounds
allocated 20% of the bid score to local content requirements. 130 This is why
Brazil’s authorities decided to remove such criteria from later bid rounds.
Policies that take a balanced approach, that are phased in131 and adjusted
in line with changing market conditions and phased out if no longer needed,
tend to have at their center of attention a stable industrialization of the
domestic economy and ensuing long-term prosperity of the host country
rather than pursuit of unattainably high goals for quick, often politically
motivated, impact but little actual effect on most people’s living standard.
V. Conclusion
There are many examples (including Brazil, Norway, and the UK), in
which LCPs in the petroleum sector have demonstrated the capacity to
trigger widespread and beneficial economic changes. However, their
introduction into other oil and gas provinces of the world has, by and large,
underachieved. The outcome of a World Bank analysis132 of LCPs in
129. It is therefore worth noting the recent move by Brazil’s government to modify
minimum local content percentages for oil and gas companies with the aim of boosting
investment. David Casallas, Brazil sets new upstream local content percentages,
BNAMERICAS (Feb. 23, 2017).
130. See Perrine Toledano and Sophie Thomashausen, Local Content Brazil – Petroleum,
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/03/
Local-Content-Brazil-Petroleum-CCSI-May-2017.pdf. (last accessed July 30, 2017).
131. Ghana’s 2013 Petroleum (Local Content and Local Participation in Petroleum
Activities) Regulations, for example, provide for a staggered approach to local goods and
services: 10% at the start, 50% after 5 years, increasing to 60-90% at the 10-year threshold
in the First Schedule Part 1. See supra note 118.
132. Tordo, supra note 6, at xiii.
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petroleum sectors across 48 countries world-wide suggests that poor
performance of such policies may be due to their key drivers being political
imperatives rather than considerations of economic efficiency, which were
often treated only as afterthoughts. In addition, the authors of that study133
seemed unable to find evidence that countries which had adopted LCPs
actually made any prior attempt to assess and compare costs and potential
benefits of local content with those of alternative policy options. The less
developed the economy of a host country, particularly of a new
hydrocarbon province, the more assertive the LCP 134 which that country has
adopted tends to be, “imposing measures that limit investors’ choices with
respect to employment, purchasing strategies, localization, and the transfer
of knowledge” in a particularly unfavorable way. This may be designed to
force foreign investors to help advance that country’s economy rather than
incentivize them to do so by creating win-win situations (including but not
limited to creating incentives to increase local content implementation).
Yet, there is hope for the future of LCPs. If there is one area of
commonality that naturally exists between host governments and foreign
companies, it often is a strong long-term interest in increasing local content.
Whereas for governments this is usually driven by political aspirations, for
foreign investors it will present a means to, amongst other goals, cutting
costs (including for expat staff), avoiding constant border and visa delays
and increasing ties with local markets. Instead of expecting, however, that
this long-term objective investors and the host government have in common
will instantly bear fruit, simply because wide-ranging local content
obligations are being imposed by law or regulation, governments would do
better to focus on improving basic infrastructure and address trade/industry
policy deficiencies to create the kind of business environment in which
companies can thrive and foreign investors will be keen to invest.
Otherwise overly-aggressive local content targets will further burden
foreign investors with an additional expense of doing business in that
country, causing them to either reduce their exposure to that host country or
experience a reduction in the profits they can realize there, which would
ultimately lead to pressure from shareholders or lenders in their home
country or countries to shrink investment in the relevant host country even
more, something that usually comes to a head at times, such as now, of low
commodity prices.135136 This is why LCPs should have realistic short-, mid-,
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. UNCTAD, supra note 107, at 17.
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and long-term goals and encourage a cooperative compliance mentality
rather than a punitive one.
Therefore, LCPs should be developed consistent within the context of
each individual country against its own economic, social and political
background. Lessons from other countries could be relevant but they cannot
be purely adopted in another jurisdiction without careful consideration and
likely adaptations. The expectations of all stakeholders should be clearly
understood and balanced, otherwise the introduction of LCPs may lead to
further disruptions. Finally, LCPs should provide a reasonable progression
with, and realism between the target goals and, the attached terms and
conditions which should be suitable for each given jurisdiction and location
of the petroleum assets. Failure to address such considerations are likely to
cause market disruption, and inefficient and/or unfeasible procedures and
might lead to a higher incidence of corruption.

136. See Marine and Petroleum Nigeria, supra note 112; see also notes 40, 124, and 128.
.
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